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Gamble, Dual Sovereignty, and
Due Process
Anthony J. Colangelo*

Introduction
The Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause is an analytically
gnarly beast. What seems like a fairly straightforward prohibition
on multiple prosecutions for the same crime turns out to be a bramble bush of doctrinal twists and snarls. At the center is the so-called
dual sovereignty doctrine. This principle holds that separate sovereigns (for example, a state and the federal government) may prosecute for what looks like the same “offence”—to use the Constitution’s
language1—because they have separate laws. And because those
laws prohibit separate offenses, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s bar
on multiple prosecutions for the same offense simply does not come
into play. As a doctrine that relates to a right guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, it’s remarkably one-dimensional in favor of government.
In Gamble v. United States2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and built
upon this view, or what I have called a “jurisdictional theory” of double jeopardy.3 This theory peels back the label “sovereign” to extract
its underlying rationale. Namely, sovereign means an entity with
independent jurisdiction to make and apply law, or “prescriptive
* Gerald J. Ford research fellow and professor of law, Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law. I thank Ronald J. Allen, Jeffrey Bellin, Brent Ferguson, Martin
H. Redish, Carrie J. Rief, Meghan J. Ryan, and the SMU Law Faculty Forum audience
for helpful comments. J. Collin Spring provided truly outstanding research assistance.
1 The full language of the Double Jeopardy Clause reads: “nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const.
amend. V.
2

139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).

Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional
Theory, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 769, 775 (2009).
3
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jurisdiction,” and that prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes independent jurisdiction to enforce law through a separate prosecution. This
terminological move from sovereignty to jurisdiction is not just semantic. Rather, it opens up analysis. The theory holds strong explanatory power for current double jeopardy law and practice as well as
dynamic doctrinal and normative implications for double jeopardy
law going forward—perhaps most of all for U.S. prosecutions relating
to criminal activity abroad, such as human rights abuses, piracy, and
various forms of terrorism.
The move also imports a whole other part of the Constitution: The
Due Process Clause, or Clauses—the Fourteenth Amendment’s for
the states4 and the Fifth Amendment’s for the federal government5 —
for any exercise of jurisdiction in this country must be measured
against due process. In other words, if the sovereign has no jurisdiction over the offense, the sovereign cannot successively prosecute.
Here Gamble’s language that the United States might successively
prosecute for crimes abroad when it has “interests” fits snugly into
existing due process analyses because both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment tests also involve interest analyses.
On this view, one question Gamble opens up is whether a prior
prosecution might mitigate or erase state interests for purposes of
due process and, hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause. Indeed, we already know this to be the case in at least one scenario: where the
sole interest is in enforcing international law, the United States is
jurisdictionally barred from successively prosecuting because the
prior prosecution would have extinguished the only law available—
international law—under which the defendant cannot be prosecuted
twice. To be sure, this view of double jeopardy was articulated by
Justice William Johnson in 1820.
Part I of this article is primarily descriptive. It seeks to recruit
the Court’s own language stretching back to the early 19th century
to trace the origins and development of the jurisdictional view of
double jeopardy. Part II also describes the law, in particular Gamble,
with a focus, first, on the Court’s adoption of a jurisdictional view
and, second, on the Court’s use of a state-interest analysis to explain

4
5

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
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when the United States might seek successively to prosecute for
crimes occurring abroad.
Part III contains the meat of the analysis. It attempts to interrelate
the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses in light of the the dual
sovereignty doctrine. There is a certain structural appeal here. The
Double Jeopardy Clause and Due Process Clause protections against
federal power appear in the same amendment,6 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy protection against the states.7
I begin by explaining that due process depends on state interests
and that this interest analysis matches up with Gamble’s observation
that the United States may seek a successive prosecution where it has
an interest. I then propose that a useful measure of state interests
can be found in international law. Indeed, this is exactly the body
of law Gamble used to explain when the United States has an interest in successively prosecuting. International law is an appropriate
gauge because it captures traditional bases of jurisdiction, and due
process depends precisely upon traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Moreover, it is a body of law that courts already
use when measuring U.S. interests in prosecuting crimes abroad
under the Due Process Clause. Thus I argue not that international
law limits a successive prosecution of its own force, but rather that
it can be incorporated into the Due Process Clause to measure
state interests. The more attenuated the interest, the weaker the
jurisdictional claim. When combined with other factors—such as
the influence one prosecuting entity has over the other, the extent
to which the entities’ laws and sentencing align, and whether the
prior prosecution was a sham designed to shield the accused—there
may be situations where a successively prosecuting state’s interest is
diminished to the vanishing point.
Exactly what such a disqualification of sovereignty would look
like in precise fact is largely beyond the prescience of this author;
my purpose in this short essay is merely to hatch an idea. But we do
know at least one scenario, alluded to above, in which a U.S. interest
in successively prosecuting would be erased by a prior prosecution:
where the sole basis of jurisdiction would be to enforce international
6
7

Id.

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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law against certain universal crimes like human rights abuses,
piracy, and certain acts of terrorism.

I. The Jurisdictional View of Sovereignty
This part traces the development of the dual sovereignty doctrine
as fundamentally a doctrine of jurisdiction. At the outset, it will
help to break out jurisdiction into three main types: (1) prescriptive;
(2) adjudicative; and (3) enforcement. Prescriptive jurisdiction is
generally understood as the power to make and apply law;8 adjudicative jurisdiction is generally understood as the power to subject
persons and things to judicial process;9 and enforcement jurisdiction
is generally understood as the power to enforce law.10 These are just
heuristics, but they do a good job helping distinguish different doctrinal tests from one another—for example, the test for personal jurisdiction before a court (adjudicative) from the test regarding when
a state may apply its law for choice of law purposes (prescriptive).
I propose that the Supreme Court’s dual sovereignty jurisprudence
can be viewed as upholding successive prosecutions for the same
crime where prosecuting entities have independent jurisdiction
to make and apply law, or prescriptive jurisdiction, which in turn
authorizes independent jurisdiction to enforce that law through a
separate prosecution.
Two cases from 1820 suggest the dual sovereignty doctrine. The
first is Houston v. Moore, a case involving state application of a federal law punishing delinquency from military service.11 As the
Court explained, “[t]his concerns the jurisdiction of a State military
tribunal to adjudicate in a case which depends on a law of Congress,
and to enforce it.”12 Thus the question presented was framed in
terms of concurrent jurisdiction by courts—not legislatures—over
the same offense:
Is it competent to a Court Martial, deriving its jurisdiction
under State authority, to try and punish militia men, drafted,
8 Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 101 (Am. Law Inst.
2018).
9

Id.

10
11

Id.

18 U.S. 1, 4 (1820).

12

192

Id. at 24–25.

Gamble, Dual Sovereignty, and Due Process
detached and called forth by the President into the service
of the United States, who have refused, or neglected to obey
the call?13

The Court answered yes and observed that the offense was the
same in both state and federal court because it originated from the
same—federal—law.14
And here’s where some double jeopardy language came in. Justice
Bushrod Washington, writing for the Court (sort of15), addressed the
argument that such a rule “might subject the accused to be twice
tried for the same offence.”16 Washington rejected this argument, explaining that “if the jurisdiction of the two courts be concurrent, the
sentence of either Court, either of conviction or acquittal, might be
pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other.”17 But again, this
was only so because the state court was applying federal law, and
the accused could not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense
under the same law.18 Houston therefore left the dual sovereignty
question open; all it stands for is the uncontroversial proposition
that someone cannot be prosecuted multiple times under the same
law, and it limited itself to that scenario.19
13
14

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.

As David Currie has noted, “Washington, however, cannot be said to have spoken
for the Court in Houston” because of the disagreement on the reasoning for the judgment. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789–1888 110 (1st ed. 1985). Justice Washington suggested as much, writing at
the end of his opinion: “Two of the judges are of opinion, that the law in question is
unconstitutional, and that the judgment below ought to be reversed. The other judges
are of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed; but they do not concur in all
respects in the reasons which influence my opinion.” Houston, 18 U.S. at 32. Justice
Johnson was clear on this, explaining at the end of his concurrence that “there is no
point whatever decided except that the fine was constitutionally imposed” by the state
court, and that “[t]he course of reasoning by which the judges have reached this conclusion are [sic] various, coinciding in but one thing, viz., that there is no error in the
judgment [below].” Id. at 47.
15

16
17

Houston, 18 U.S. at 31.
Id.

Washington posited the opposite scenario in which a federal court could not separately adjudicate a state civil law cause of action after the state court had already adjudicated that same cause of action. Id.
18

19

See id. at 31–33.
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But Justice Johnson did not so limit himself. Instead, he gave a
full-throated exposition of the dual sovereignty doctrine as a matter
of prescriptive jurisdiction, asking rhetorically, “Why may not the
same offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States,
and of the United States?”20 He answered:
Every citizen of a State owes a double allegiance; he enjoys
the protection and participates in the government of both the
State and the United States. . . . [W]here the United States
cannot assume, or where they have not assumed [an] exclusive
exercise of power, I cannot imagine a reason why the States
may not also, if they feel themselves injured by the same
offence, assert their right of inflicting punishment also.21

Indeed, “[t]he actual exercise of this concurrent right of punishing is familiar to every day’s practice,” according to Johnson, who
gave the example of robbing the mail on a highway “which is unquestionably cognizable as highway-robbery under State laws,” but
also a federal offense under U.S. law.22 Finally, Johnson turned to the
consequences of a contrary rule, namely, that states could block a
successive federal prosecution “when their real object is nothing less
than to embarrass, the progress of the general government.”23 The
dual sovereignty rule, on the other hand, would prevent this “evil.”24
He continued to reject the argument in jurisdictional terms:
But this is a doctrine [prior acquittal as a bar to double
jeopardy] which can only be maintained on the ground
that an offence against the laws of the one government is
an offence against the other government; and can surely
never be successfully asserted in any instances but those in
which jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts by statutory
provisions of the United States. . . . [C]rimes against a
government are only cognizable in its own Courts, or in
those which derive their right of holding jurisdiction from
the offended government.25
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
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A couple of points come out of Houston. One is that the Court focused on different forms of jurisdiction when evaluating the double
jeopardy question. Where multiple prosecutions were posed under
the same law, or prescriptive jurisdiction, the prohibition on double
jeopardy would kick in—even if the enforcement agents were different courts. But, at least for Justice Johnson, where the laws emanated
from concurrent but independent prescriptive jurisdictions of different sovereigns, multiple prosecutions were permissible (and, in
some cases, a good idea). If any doubt remains as to Justice Johnson’s
views regarding double jeopardy, it ought to be erased by his opinion for the Court in United States v. Furlong,26 decided two weeks
after Houston.
Furlong was a piracy case. Dicta in the opinion made a sharp distinction between the parochial crime of murder on the one hand
and the international crime of piracy on the other.27 This distinction had an outcome-determinative effect for double jeopardy law
and practice. Piracy, as a result of a legal fiction, was outside the national jurisdiction of any state.28 Pirates were by definition stateless
individuals sailing on stateless vessels acknowledging the authority of no government (hence the black flag).29 Elsewhere, the Court
described them as “persons on board vessels which throw off their
national character by cruising piratically and committing piracy
on other vessels.”30 The crime was not “committed against the particular sovereignty of a foreign power; but . . . against all nations,
26
27

See 18 U.S. (5. Wheat) 184 (1820).
Id. at 197.

See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); see also, e.g.,
Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). To ensure that pirates were
prosecuted wherever they were found and assertions of jurisdiction over them occasioned no interference with the sovereignty of other states, pirates were deemed outside
of any state’s national jurisdiction; see also Justice Antonin Scalia’s more recent description in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748–49 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part). Absent the fiction, prosecution of a pirate in custody for acts occurring outside
the prosecuting state’s territory theoretically could infringe another state’s sovereignty;
specifically, the state (or state’s vessel) where the act occurred because, at the time, jurisdiction was strictly territorial in nature and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
was seen as interfering with the sovereignty of the state where the crime occurred.
28

29 See generally David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life among the Pirates (1995).
30

Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 153.
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including the United States.”31 All states had jurisdiction over piracy
not as a matter of their independent national jurisdiction over territory or national persons, but instead based on a shared international jurisdiction, or what’s called “universal jurisdiction.”32 Furlong
explained that piracy “is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all;
and there can be no doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit [already
acquitted] would be good in any civilized State, though resting on
a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State.”33
That sounds like the prohibition on double jeopardy.
But, the Court went on, “Not so with the crime of murder.”34 For
murder, unlike piracy, was not an offense under international law
“within this universal jurisdiction”35 of all states, but rather was an
offense against each state’s national laws. “It is punishable under the
laws of each State, and . . . an acquittal in [the defendant’s] case would
not have been a good plea in a Court of Great Britain.”36 Moreover,
unlike with piracy, there was a jurisdictional limitation on prosecuting for murder: “punishing it when committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what is the same thing,) in the vessel of another nation,
has not been acknowledged as a right, much less an obligation.”37
In other words, where there was no basis for independent national
jurisdiction, a state could not prosecute. The Court went on, noting
that U.S. citizens could nonetheless be subject to international double jeopardy by multiple nations with concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction over their crimes: “As to our own citizens . . . their subjection
to those [U.S.] laws follows them every where,”38 and while the U.S.
Constitution may protect them from multiple prosecutions under
31 Id. at 152; cf. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161–62 (1820) (“The
common law . . . recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own
municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations, (which is part of the common law,) as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an
enemy of the human race.”).
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. law, this protection does not extend to prosecutions under foreign law where foreign nations have jurisdiction, for “if [the accused]
are also made amenable to the laws of another State, it is the result of
their own act in subjecting themselves to those laws.”39
In sum, Furlong speaks of two types of law emanating from two
types of jurisdiction: one national, the other international. National
law derives from states’ independent jurisdiction over national territory and persons. International law stems from the shared interests
of all states to proscribe certain offenses that affect the international
community. Where two states have independent national jurisdiction to prosecute, each may do so because each has an independent
law and the bar on double jeopardy does not attach. But where international or universal jurisdiction authorizes the application of only
international law, multiple prosecutions are prohibited because the
first state to prosecute would have “used up” the international law
and a subsequent prosecution would thus, impermissibly, be for the
same offense, under the same law, twice.
A string of opinions prior to the first actual application of the dual
sovereignty doctrine in 192240 only cements the jurisdictional reasoning in Houston and Furlong. The defendant in Fox v. Ohio challenged her
state conviction for passing counterfeit coin on the ground that only
the federal government had jurisdiction over that offense.41 The Court
disposed of her argument by distinguishing counterfeiting, which
was an offense exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal government to proscribe, from passing counterfeit coin, which was fraud
within the state’s jurisdiction to proscribe.42 Three years later, United
States v. Marigold reaffirmed Fox’s jurisdictional holding, explaining
that the states and Congress each had an independent jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish uttering false currency.43 Then two years after
Marigold, Moore v. Illinois solidified the jurisdictional foundation laid
by the prior case law. Moore involved a challenge to a state court conviction under an Illinois law outlawing the harboring of fugitive slaves.44
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 197–98.

United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 433 (1847).
Id. at 433–34.

United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 569–70 (1850).
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 17 (1852).
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Moore argued that the federal Fugitive Slave Act preempted the
Illinois statute, a necessary result because otherwise he could be prosecuted twice for the same offense.45 As to the preemption argument,
the Court found that Illinois had an independent jurisdiction to outlaw
the harboring of fugitive slaves.46 And as to the related double jeopardy argument, the Court announced the dual sovereignty doctrine:
An offence, in its legal signification, means a transgression of
a law. . . . Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of
a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two
sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction
of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or
transgression of the laws of both. . . . That either or both may
(if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted.
Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice
punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he
has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar
to a conviction by the other.47

Finally, a true dual sovereignty case presented itself. United States v.
Lanza upheld a successive federal prosecution under the Volstead Act
after a state conviction for the same acts.48 The Court explained that
“[e]ach State, as also Congress, may exercise an independent judgment
in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition. Such as are
adopted by Congress become laws of the United States and such as are
adopted by a State become laws of that State.”49 In jurisdictional terms,
the “independent judgment” to make and enforce law “is an inseparable incident of independent legislative action in distinct jurisdictions.”50
Indeed, the Court observed that the dual sovereignty “doctrine is thoroughly established. But, upon an analysis of the principle on which it
is founded, it will be found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be
punished is one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.”51
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.

Id. at 18.

Id. at 19–20.

Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 384 (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 445 (1915))
(emphasis added).
51
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The Court repeated this reasoning in subsequent cases upholding
a federal prosecution following a state court conviction for the same
act,52 a successive state court conviction following an acquittal of the
same acts in federal court,53 and a successive federal prosecution following a conviction by an Indian tribunal.54
Moreover, the Court didn’t find dual sovereignties only in respect
to federal versus state and tribal authorities. In Heath v. Alabama the
Court considered the case of a man prosecuted twice for a murder
resulting from a kidnapping in Alabama, with the victim’s body
being found in Georgia.55 Heath pleaded guilty in Georgia to avoid
the death penalty, but was then retried in Alabama, where he was
sentenced to death.56 Before the Alabama trial, Heath leveled two
challenges: one, he interposed the bar on double jeopardy; two, he
contested Alabama’s jurisdiction.57 The Court found the jurisdictional challenge waived,58 but there was something to it. It appeared
that the vast majority of the acts leading up to the murder, including
the planning, preparation, and murder itself, took place in Georgia
(though the victim had been kidnapped in Alabama).59 Moreover,
Heath argued, the offenses for which he was prosecuted were identical for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,60 and his initial
conviction in Georgia was the fruit of a joint investigation between
52
53

Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).

Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2003).
54

55
56

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84 (1985).
Id. at 85–86.

Id. at 85. Although Heath initially framed this as a “plea to the territorial jurisdiction of the Alabama court” (see Brief for Petitioner, Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985)
(No. 84-5555), 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 940 at *10), this argument would more appropriately have been styled as an objection to the application of Alabama law, since
the court would have had jurisdiction over Heath by virtue of his physical custody.
57

58
59

Id. at 87.

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 57, at *13–15.

Id. at *13. The relevant test here is the so-called Blockburger test. See Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.”). For how the Blockburger test might factor into
this essay’s thesis that due process might constrain a sovereign’s jurisdiction, see infra
note 135 and accompanying text.
60
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Georgia and Alabama law enforcement.61 I would only point out
that, on the analysis developed in Part III, the Court would have had
to consider Heath’s objections to Alabama’s jurisdiction for it was
that very jurisdiction, the ability to apply Alabama law to him, that
made Alabama a “sovereign” within the meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
In deciding the case on double jeopardy grounds, the Court basically restated the dual sovereignty doctrine and then applied it to
the states. The restatement of the doctrine was largely a recitation of
quotations from previous cases.62 More interesting was the Court’s
discussion of why the doctrine applied to successive prosecutions by
multiple states as opposed to states versus the federal government.
Here the Court had to discern why, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, different states were separate sovereigns. The Court began by
quoting Lanza’s statement that “[e]ach government in determining
what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising
its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”63 That is to say, each government has independent jurisdiction to prescribe law. The Court
repeated, “each has the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority
and to punish such offenses, and in doing so each is exercising its
own sovereignty, not that of the other.”64 Thus, according to the
Court, sovereignty really meant independent jurisdiction to make
and apply law and the attendant jurisdiction to enforce that law.
But the Court did not always find this independent power. Grafton
v. United States65 is best conceptually understood as the intellectual heir of Houston. Grafton was serving in the U.S. Army in the
61 Id. at *17. Although not grounded in due process, Heath also made a species of
interest argument that the prior Georgia prosecution reduced Alabama’s interest and
that Heath’s individual interest against multiple prosecutions outweighed Alabama’s
reduced interest. Id. at *27–31. Accord Ronald J. Allen and John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath
v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 801, 823 (1985) (“A more realistic approach to ascertaining state
interests than the definitional approach of the Court would have been for the Court to
examine the extent to which the states actually assert that they have unique interests
which cannot be satisfied by prior prosecution in another state.”).
62

Heath, 474 U.S. at 88–89 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382; Houston, 18 U.S. at 19, 20).

63
64
65
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Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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then-U.S. territory of the Philippines.66 While on duty, he killed two
Filipinos and was tried by a military court martial under the Articles of War.67 He was acquitted and then retried in the Filipino court
system, where he was convicted of homicide under the Philippine
Penal Code.68 The Supreme Court explained that the court martial’s
“jurisdiction is not exclusive, but only concurrent with that of civil
courts.”69 In other words, there was concurrent adjudicative juris
diction. That is, “[t]he act done is a civil crime, and the trial is for
that act. The proceedings are had in a court-martial because the
offender is personally amenable to that jurisdiction[.]”70 But as to
prescriptive jurisdiction, it emanated “from the same government,
namely, that of the United States[.]”71 Indeed, the court martial’s
prescriptive jurisdiction even depended on the civil penal code: “a
general court-martial has, under existing statutes, in time of peace,
jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier of the Army for any offense,
not capital, which the civil law declares to be a crime against the
public.”72 Thus the court martial prosecuted Grafton for “the crime
of homicide as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines.”73 Because both the court martial and the Filipino Penal Code shared the
same fundamental prescriptive jurisdiction,
the same acts constituting a crime against the United States
cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused in a
court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a second
trial of the accused for that crime in the same or another
court, civil or military, of the same government.74

Just as in Houston, there was concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction. In Houston, it was the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts. In Grafton, it was the concurrent jurisdiction of courts
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 341.

Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.

Id. at 349.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 352.
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martial and local civil courts. But in both cases prescriptive jurisdiction drew power from a single source: the federal government.
Because there was only one source of prescriptive jurisdiction,
there was only one “offence,” for which the accused could not be
doubly tried.75

II. Gamble

Throughout the course of the opinion, Gamble uses the jurisdictional view that has been discussed so far. The Court started out
by explaining, “[w]e have long held that a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not ‘the same offence’ as a crime under the laws of
another sovereign.”76 Thus, “a State may prosecute a defendant under
state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted him for the
same conduct under a federal statute.”77 And as we by now know,
by that reasoning the reverse is true also: a federal prosecution following a state prosecution is permissible, and that’s what happened
to Gamble. He had been prosecuted by Alabama under a state law
prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and then prosecuted by
the federal government for the same acts under a federal felon-inpossession law.78
75 On the basis that territorial law is derivative of federal law, the Supreme Court
more recently held that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S.
Ct. 1863, 1869–70 (2016) (“Because that [prosecutorial] power originally ‘derived from
the United States Congress’—i.e., the same source on which federal prosecutors rely—
the Commonwealth could not retry Sánchez Valle and Gómez for unlawfully selling
firearms.”) (internal citations omitted). On this logic, the Court has also found that a
municipality is not a distinct sovereign from a state because, like Congress’s power
over the territories, the state legislature, according to the Florida Constitution, had
the power “to establish, and to abolish, municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any
time.” Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 n.4 (1970) (brackets and internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). This comports with “the traditional view . . . that the
Supreme Court has predicated the constitutional status of local governments entirely
on the theory that a local government is merely an administrative arm of the state,
utterly lacking in autonomy or in constitutional rights against the state that created
it.” Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1990).
76
77
78
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The Court then turned to the text. Here it focused on the word
“offence” and quoted Justice Antonin Scalia’s “soon-vindicated”79
dissent in Grady v. Corbin, a case involving whether a single state
could prosecute for different offenses arising out of the same facts.80
There, Justice Scalia explained that “the language of the Clause . . .
protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy ‘for the same
offence,’ not for the same conduct or actions,” and “‘[o]ffence’ was
commonly understood in 1791 to mean ‘transgression,’ that is, ‘the
Violation or Breaking of a Law.’”81 In light of this understanding,
“[i]f the same conduct violates two (or more) laws, then each offense
may be separately prosecuted.”82 Gamble transitioned this reasoning
into the dual sovereignty context through the following syllogism:
“an ‘offence’ is defined by a law, and each law is defined by a sover
eign. So where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two
‘offenses.’”83 This implicitly raises the question of what constitutes
a “sovereign.” As I hope to have shown by now, a sovereign is an
entity that enjoys independent power to make and apply law, or prescriptive jurisdiction.
The Court next turned to the cases.84 Unsurprisingly, it rehearsed
the dual sovereignty reasoning of Fox, Marigold, and Moore.85 But
what’s interesting here is the Court’s heavy emphasis on “the substantive differences between the interests that two sovereigns can
have in punishing the same act.”86 Hence the Court did not stop at an
antiseptic jurisdictional reading of these opinions; rather, it went out
of its way to “honor” the different federal and state interests at play in
79
80
81
82

Id. at 1965.

Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).

Id. at 529 (internal citations omitted).
Id.

Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965. The Court also quoted parenthetically Moore’s statement that “[t]he constitutional provision is not, that no person shall be subject, for the
same act, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; but for the same offence, the same
violation of law, no person’s life or limb shall be twice put in jeopardy.” Id. (quoting
Moore, 55 U.S. at 17) (internal emphasis omitted).
83

84 I should note that Houston v. Moore and United States v. Furlong were discussed in
the Court’s opinion, but were done so later on in the part of the opinion dealing with
Gamble’s arguments, which relied on those cases. See id. at 1976–79. The Court’s reading of both cases is consistent with the argument presented here.
85
86

Id. at 1966–67.
Id. at 1966.
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the successive prosecution scenarios illustrated by the cases. In Fox,
it was the state’s interest in prohibiting the passing of counterfeit
coin;87 and in Marigold, a case involving uttering false currency, the
crime was measured by its “character in reference to each” prosecuting entity.88 Moore, according to the Court, “expanded on this
concern for the different interests of separate sovereigns”89 by describing the hypothetical assault on a U.S. marshal that would offend both national (“hindering the execution of legal process”90) and
state (“breaching the peace of the State”91) interests.92
And then the Court veered off the precedential track, so to speak. It
speculated about the implications of Gamble’s theory when it comes
to prosecuting for crimes abroad. The Court worried that “[i]f . . . only
one sovereign may prosecute for a single act, no American court—
state or federal—could prosecute conduct already tried in a foreign
court.”93 What about a U.S. national murdered abroad? In keeping
with an interest analysis, the country where the murder occurred
could “rightfully seek to punish the killer” because “[t]he foreign
country’s interest lies in protecting the peace in that territory rather
than protecting the American specifically.”94 But the United States
would also have an interest: the interest not to see its nationals
killed—an interest captured by “customary international law.”95 Or
we may have other “key national interests,” among which might be
“punishing crimes committed by U.S. nationals abroad.”96 The Court
then repeated its interest approach in no uncertain terms: “a crime
against two sovereigns constitutes two offenses because each sovereign has an interest to vindicate.”97
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1966–67 (cleaned up).
Id. at 1967 (cleaned up).

That the Court chose not to “honor” the specific facts and laws at play in Moore
is not that surprising. The case involved upholding a state prosecution for harboring
fugitive slaves. Moore, 55 U.S. at 17.
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If sovereign means jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is triggered by
interests, what interests count? And, can they ever be mitigated
by a prior prosecution so as to render a successive prosecution
unconstitutional?

III. Due Process and Double Jeopardy
Before answering those questions, we must give them some constitutional context. Any exercise of jurisdiction in this country must
comply with due process. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause regulates assertions of state power98 while the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause regulates the federal government.99 The relevant type of jurisdiction for our purposes is, again,
prescriptive—or the power to make and apply law. Unlike in civil
cases, criminal cases do not proceed in absentia in the United States,
so the court will always have personal, adjudicative jurisdiction
over the accused (even if custody is obtained by force or fraud).100
The applicable Supreme Court test for discerning whether an assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction comports with due process requires
that a state have “a significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”101 That is the test under
the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court has not yet resolved the test
under the Fifth Amendment. But lower courts that have considered
the matter agree that Fifth Amendment due process applies so as not
to render the application of federal law “arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair.”102 The tests vary, but all appear to have found this “common
denominator.”103

98
99

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. Const. amend. V.

See Anthony J. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 69, 84 (2012); Anthony
J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1303, 1330
nn.139–41 (2014).
100

101

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 966
(9th Cir. 1995).
102

103 United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 262 (D.D.C. 2013). See also United
States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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In recent years, both the states104 and the federal government105 have
been experimenting with stretching jurisdiction beyond territorial
borders. The federal government in particular has begun projecting
U.S. law abroad in aggressive and unprecedented ways.106 This boom
of what’s called “extraterritorial jurisdiction” has triggered a spike in
due process challenges to the application of U.S. law abroad.107 I want
to use these jurisdictional assertions to build out and illustrate my
argument interrelating the Due Process Clauses and the Double Jeopardy Clause; namely, if we take seriously due process and combine it
with the interest analysis suggested by Gamble, there may be situations in which a prior prosecution might mitigate a successively prosecuting state’s interest so as to render subsequent application of its
law arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, thus vitiating the state’s status
as sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Recall, although the dual sovereignty “doctrine is thoroughly established . . .
[u]pon an analysis of the principle on which it is founded, it will be
found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be punished is
one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.”108
104 U.S. states have for the most part adopted statutes, based on the Model Penal
Code, that enlarge their territorial jurisdiction to encompass conduct within the state
that leads to, or is intended to lead to, a harmful result outside the state, as well as
conduct outside the state that leads to, or is intended to lead to, a harmful result inside
the state. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.4(c) (4th ed. 2014). The
constitutionality of this legislation has been held not to violate due process “[b]ecause
such legislation adheres to the territoriality principle.” Id.
105

See infra notes 111–16.

These jurisdictional assertions have led to a substantial number of international
double jeopardy cases in U.S. courts. See, e.g., United States v. Alcocer Roa, 753 F.
App’x 846 (11th Cir. 2018) (U.S. prosecution following Panamanian prosecution);
United States v. Ducuara De Saiz, 511 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2013) (prior Colombian
prosecution); United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2010) (prior South Korean
prosecution); United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (prior Greek
prosecution); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d, 1121, 1126–27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (prior
Maltese prosecution); United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (prior
Dutch Antillean prosecution); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1362
(11th Cir. 1994) (prior Bahamian prosecution); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730
F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984) (prior Malaysian prosecution); United States v. McRary,
616 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1980) (prior Cuban prosecution); United States v. Richardson,
580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978) (prior Guatemalan proceedings); United States v.
Martin, 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior Bahamian prosecution).
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Lanza, 260 U.S. at 384 (quoting S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. at 445).
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Because federal extraterritoriality over crimes abroad promises
to be the most fast-moving and controversial area going forward,
this analysis focuses principally on that scenario. As noted, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a state
have contacts creating state interests such that application of its law
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.109 The same type of
reasoning permeates Fifth Amendment due process regarding extensions of federal law. Courts began articulating Fifth Amendment
due process as a “nexus” requirement,110 and this test still prevails
in some circuits.111 Other circuits have rejected112 or atrophied it.113
Despite the varying tests, however, it should come as no surprise
that courts approving the extension of U.S. law abroad have found
it to be in the United States’s interests to do so. This is not to say
that courts always come out and announce, “It is in the interests

109

Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 312–13 (1981).

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that due process requires a “sufficient nexus” such that application of U.S. law is not “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair”) (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1991)).
110

111 Id. See also United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying
nexus test in prosecution for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, among other charges).

112 United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2016) (Due process
does not require a nexus between the defendants and the United States in a suit
brought under the MDLEA.); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir.
2014) (same). United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375–77 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that no nexus is required where the flag nation consented or waived objection to enforcement); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that Congress
may override a nexus requirement.).

113 See, e.g., United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding an
exception to the nexus requirement where the offense is subject to universal jurisdiction). Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119 (finding an exception to the nexus requirement where
conduct is “self-evidently” criminal); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding an exception to the nexus requirement when defendants are
aboard “stateless vessels”); Ali, 718 F.3d at 943–44 (finding an exception to the nexus
requirement when a treaty exists on the substance of cause of action); United States
v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2008) (no nexus required where acts took place on
a stateless vessel); United States v. White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 1997)
(“[W]here the government seeks to prosecute a United States citizen for acts occurring
in foreign lands, due process does not require a demonstration of ‘nexus.’”). Although
the tests may look different on the surface, they all coalesce around international law
principles of jurisdiction to determine whether an assertion of jurisdiction is arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair.
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of the United States to apply our law in this situation.”114 Rather,
courts tend to draw from an established source of markers for state
interests—indeed, the same source that the Court in Gamble drew
from: international law.115
As discussed in Part II, Gamble spoke of a U.S. interest in successively prosecuting where a U.S. national is injured abroad116 —or
what is called the passive-personality basis of jurisdiction117—and
where crimes are committed by U.S. nationals abroad118 —or the
active-
personality basis of jurisdiction.119 And it explicitly noted
that international law permits jurisdiction on these bases to support
114 Though some courts have explicitly said that where it is in the “interest” of the
United States to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, due process is satisfied—and in the
international double jeopardy context to boot. See White, 51 F. Supp. at 1011 (upholding jurisdiction on the basis of defendant’s U.S. citizenship [the nationality basis of
jurisdiction under international law] because “[t]he interest of the United States in this
case can hardly be questioned.”); see also United States v. Murillo, 826 F.3d 152, 157
(4th Cir. 2016) (holding that “it is not arbitrary to prosecute a defendant in the United
States if his actions affected significant American interests—even if the defendant did
not mean to affect those interests”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Compliance with international law satisfies due process because it puts a defendant on notice that he
could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (“In determining whether due process
is satisfied, we are guided by principles of international law”; finding due process
satisfied by relying on the interests created by the territorial principle and the protective principle); United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir.
2011) (“In determining whether an extraterritorial law comports with due process,
appellate courts often consult international law principles such as the objective principle, the protective principle, or the territorial principle.”); Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2
(“[i]nternational law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a sufficient
nexus exists between the defendant and the United States”); Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. at
262 (“whatever the Due Process Clause requires, it is satisfied where the United States
applies its laws extraterritorially pursuant to the universality principle” of international law) (internal citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382,
393 (5th Cir. 2016) (relying on objective territoriality in finding due process satisfied);
Murillo, 826 F.3d at 157–58 (relying on passive personality in finding due process satisfied); Clark, 435 F.3d at 1108–09 (relying on nationality or active personality in finding
due process satisfied); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding
jurisdiction under the protective principle where “planned attacks were intended to
affect the United States and to alter its foreign policy”).
116
117
118
119
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its analysis.120 Add to this list subjective territoriality (where conduct
occurs or has been initiated on the state’s territory),121 objective territoriality (where part but not necessarily all of the conduct is completed on the state’s territory122), and “effects” jurisdiction (where
conduct has or is intended to have an effect on the state’s territory,
even if the conduct occurs elsewhere).123 Then there’s the so-called
protective principle, which authorizes jurisdiction where conduct
affects official state functions or the security of the state.124 Finally,
there’s universal jurisdiction,125 already introduced in the discussion
of Furlong.126 This basis of jurisdiction essentially holds that certain
offenses under international law are so harmful, any state in the
world can prosecute the perpetrators.127 The idea here, as I’ve argued, is that the state is not applying its national law to the accused,
but rather is acting as the decentralized enforcement agent for an
international law that covers the globe.128
None of this is to suggest that these bases of jurisdiction on their
own have the force of law in U.S. courts such that if the United States
exceeds its jurisdiction under international law, the exercise of jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Rather, the argument is more subtle. It
seeks in effect to incorporate these jurisdictional principles into the
Due Process Clause to measure the strength of a U.S. interest in successively prosecuting. In short, the jurisdictional bases are proxies
for interests. The further away from the bases one gets, the less the
interest, and the less a successive prosecution complies with due
process and, hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause.
At this stage, a couple of points must be addressed. One involves the argument that these particular bases ought to serve as
baselines, such that the further away one gets from a basis, the more
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967.

Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 408 cmt. c.
Id.

Id. at § 409.
Id. at § 412.
Id. at § 413.

See supra notes 26–40.

See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 413.

Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict”
of Laws, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 881 (2009). See also Ali, 718 F.3d at 935 (“Universal jurisdiction is not some idiosyncratic domestic invention but a creature of international law.”).
128

209

Cato Supreme Court Review
attenuated the interest. Who’s to say that these bases, as opposed to
other bases—say, the place where the family of the accused lives—
ought to provide the constitutional touchstone? The answer is that
these bases capture the traditional rationales upon which states assert jurisdiction; indeed, it is for this very reason that they embody
customary international law.129 And due process cares deeply about
tradition, for it requires that any assertion of jurisdiction obey “tradi
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”130 Satisfaction
of this criterion, in turn, avoids the exercise of jurisdiction being
“arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”131 It is not arbitrary because the
state has a recognized basis under an established body of law applicable to all on which to apply its law. And it is not fundamentally
unfair because the individual defendant is on notice that the state’s
law may apply to him on a recognized basis under an established
body of law applicable to all.132
The next point transitions to the double jeopardy discussion. So
far we have been talking only about how attenuated the interest
must be from traditional bases of jurisdiction for it to violate the
Constitution. This question must be complicated, however. If that
were the end of the discussion, it would be no different from the
question of whether the United States has jurisdiction to begin with,
which is something courts have been wrestling with for roughly a
quarter century. The confounding variable for the present analysis is
the prior prosecution. More specifically, the constitutional question
129 Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 101 cmt. a (“customary international law . . . results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed out of a sense of international legal right or obligation.”).

130 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). I realize that citing
these cases adds to the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis considerations about adjudicative jurisdiction and, particularly, personal jurisdiction. However, as Justice William
Brennan, paraphrasing Justice Hugo Black, has pointed out, “both inquiries are often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations.”
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224–25 (1977) (internal citation omitted). Requiring
traditional bases of jurisdiction also provides a constraint on states from inventing or
manufacturing novel interests upon which to apply their laws in extravagant ways.
131

Supra note 102.

Fair notice of the law is a primary consideration in due process analysis. See
Colangelo, Spatial Legality, supra note 100, at 81.
132
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is whether an attenuated interest combined with a prior prosecution
comports with due process.
Here I want to propose other factors that may inform this calculus
on an interest analysis: (a) the degree of influence the entity seeking
successively to prosecute has on the initial prosecuting entity; (b) the
degree to which the laws and sentencing align; and (c) the degree
to which the foreign prosecution is a sham designed to shield the
accused. Each of these factors can instruct whether the successively
prosecuting state’s interest has been sufficiently vindicated so as to
render another prosecution unconstitutional.
As to the degree of influence one prosecuting entity has on the
other, the more influence, the more both states’ interests would appear to be vindicated by a single prosecution. Courts have already
carved out an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine that would
bar a successive prosecution by a separate sovereign where “one
sovereign so thoroughly dominates or manipulates the prosecutorial machinery of another that the latter retains little or no volition
in its own proceedings.”133 I agree that this must be a high bar as a
factor contributing to disqualifying sovereignty under the dual sovereignty doctrine lest it create a perverse incentive for prosecuting
entities not to engage in beneficial communication and cooperation
at the expense of giving up the right to prosecute successively.134
As to the laws aligning, the relevant test for double jeopardy purposes is the Blockburger test.135 It provides that “where the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
133 United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).
See also United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987).

134 See Rashed, 234 F.3d at 1281 (“U.S. assistance was so pervasive that Greece gathered little of the presented evidence independently. But [the exception] acknowledges
that extensive law enforcement and prosecutorial cooperation between two sovereigns
does not make a trial by either a sham.”). This is not to say that the bar could never be
met and such a foreign state prosecution could never qualify for the exception. See id.
at 1283 (“An easy case, for example, might be where a nation pursued a prosecution
that did little or nothing to advance its independent interests, under threat of withdrawal of American aid on which its leadership was heavily dependent. But where the
United States simply lends a foreign government investigatory resources, the manipulation moniker is out of the question.”).
135

See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
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offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not.”136 If the laws match up under this test
such that the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, the
less a successive prosecution would seem appropriate.137 Sentencing
can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,138 but it obviously also factors into whether the previous trial is a sham. According to the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court, if the proceedings were
undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from
criminal responsibility,” they would constitute a sham trial.139 The
more the previous trial looks like it was designed to shield the accused from criminal responsibility, the more appropriate a successive prosecution. A context-sensitive analysis that takes into account
these factors and a successively prosecuting entity’s degree of jurisdictional connection with the crime, as measured by established
bases that capture state interests, provides a sophisticated and workable constitutional test.
At the very least there is one scenario, raised by Furlong back in
1820, in which the United States would be barred from successively
136

Id.

This was the case in Heath, for example. As Heath’s counsel argued, “the elements
of the two statutes being virtually indistinguishable, the Blockburger ‘same elements’
test is also satisfied.” Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 57, at *8. The Court brushed
this type of argument aside, flatly observing that “[i]f the States are separate sovereigns, as they must be under the definition of sovereignty which the Court consistently has employed, the circumstances of the case are irrelevant.” Heath, 474 U.S.
at 92. It is submitted that, as Part I demonstrated, the definition of sovereignty hinges
on jurisdiction, and a jurisdictional analysis based on state interests may well consider
the degree to which the laws align to measure whether the successively prosecuting
state’s interests have been satisfied.
137

138 Defendants in United States v. Richardson were let go upon purchasing their
freedom in Guatemala; the court noted that a successive U.S. prosecution was appropriate in part because they “were permitted to avoid prison terms by paying a
relatively small sum of money.” 580 F.2d 946, 947 (1978). See also Rashed, 234 F.3d at
1281 (U.S. successive prosecution where defendant was released by Greek authorities after eight years following conviction for, among other things, aircraft bombing
and murder, which under U.S. law carries a sentence of death or life imprisonment);
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1125–27 (U.S. successive prosecution where defendant was released
by Maltese authorities after seven years following conviction for hostage taking and
murder, which under a U.S. law prohibiting air piracy carries a sentence of death or
life imprisonment).
139 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
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prosecuting under a jurisdictional view. Suppose the United States
seeks successively to prosecute a foreign perpetrator of piracy, terrorism, torture, or genocide not explicitly linked to U.S. territory
or nationals. There are a host of statutes on the books authorizing and arguably even mandating a U.S. prosecution in respect of
these crimes if the United States gets personal jurisdiction over
the alleged perpetrators.140 And we have pursued such prosecutions.141 But under international law, there would be no recognized
national interest regarding U.S. territory or persons upon which to
apply uniquely U.S. national law. The only interest (and indeed,
authorization) would be the enforcement of international law, as
implemented in the U.S. code, under the principle of universal jurisdiction. If a foreign nation gets there first and applies international law (via a prosecution resting on a national basis of jurisdiction or resting on universal jurisdiction), the United States may
not do so again. Now, this would require applying the definition
of the offense under international law in the foreign prosecution.
But that would largely be the case where foreign law implements
the international treaty proscribing the offense in question, since
treaties largely embody customary international law definitions
of universal crimes.142

140 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(2)(C) (American jurisdiction exists to prosecute for
bombing occurring outside the U.S. when “a perpetrator is found in the United
States.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2)(D) (genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2)
(torture); 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b)(2)(C) (aircraft piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (hostage
taking); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(2)(B) (financing terrorism).
These statutes largely implement international treaties to which we are party, which
mandate that we prosecute or extradite offenders found within our territory. See,
e.g., International Convention for the Suppresion of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art.
9(4), Sept. 14, 2005, S. Treaty Doc. No, 110-4, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5(2),
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
141 See e.g., Ali, 718 F.3d at 942, 944 (universal jurisdiction over hostage taking); Shi,
525 F.3d at 722–23 (universal jurisdiction over piracy).

142 Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 121,
176–85 (2007). The treaties do not contemplate a bar on double jeopardy by multiple
sovereigns. Rezaq, 134 F. 3d at 1129.
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Conclusion
There exists a lens through which the Supreme Court’s dual sovereignty jurisprudence coheres. That lens has been crafted by the
Court’s language throughout the history of the doctrine, spanning
back to 1820. It provides that “sovereign” really means independent
jurisdiction to make and apply law. Because any exercise of jurisdiction must comply with due process, the next question becomes
how to measure jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Due Process
Clauses. Gamble gave a clue when it explained that historically different sovereigns were justified in prosecuting successively when
they had an interest in doing so, and suggested that the United States
might prosecute successively for a foreign crime when that crime
touches U.S. interests as measured by international law.
This discussion of interests fits nicely with traditional due process tests that require established interests for a state to apply its law.
And when it comes to extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction, the
established interests are found in international law, as Gamble indicated. The further the assertion of jurisdiction gets from these bases,
the weaker the assertion of jurisdiction becomes as a matter of due
process. Combined with other factors—such as the degree of influence a successively prosecuting state has over the initial prosecution, the degree to which the prior prosecution implements laws that
align with those of the successively prosecuting state, and the extent
to which the prior prosecution is a sham, a nuanced and managable
new test emerges. Finally, where a successive prosecution is based
only on the interest in enforcing international law and the prior
prosecution has already used that same law, the successive prosecution is barred under a jurisdictional view.
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